The Political Dimensions of Sustainable Development of Tibet

　　N. Ram（India）

　　Abstract

　　The rapid and sustainable development of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), within the socialist system, in a way that benefits the three million people of the region is one of China’s strategic objectives. The economy of TAR is on a roll: it has been visibly transformed by double-digit GDP growth over two decades without a break and has entered a new stage of development, which the Chinese government has termed ‘leapfrog development.’ About half a dozen defining factors behind Tibet’s overall development are identified in this paper. Notable among them are the massive financial and resource support provided by the central government, its preferential policies for Tibet, rapid infrastructural development, and the building of a comprehensive modern transportation system, the highlight of which is the Qinghai-Tibet railway, an engineering marvel. As a result of this development, Tibet’s interaction and integration with the rest of China has deepened and its isolation from the rest of the world has decisively been ended.

　　The paper reflects on the key political issues relating to sustainable development in Tibet. A hard-won improvement in TAR’s internal and external political climate, which has defied separatist attempts at destabilization over a period of six decades, has proved congenial to the process of development of a socialist market economy and a harmonious society. There is a widening credibility gap between the make-believe world of the Dalai Lama-led ‘independence for Tibet’ movement and on-the-ground Tibetan realities and this has resulted in unprecedented disorientation and confusion among the separatist elements.

　　Tibet’s status as an integral part of the People’s Republic of China is not disputed by a single country in the world; and no country accords legal recognition to the Dalai Lama’s so-called ‘government-in-exile’ based in Dharamsala, India. Yet there is a Tibet political question lurking in the shadows of international relations, causing friction and unease in China’s bilateral relations with some major developed countries, and confusing and dividing public opinion abroad and, to an extent, at home. Journalism in the western media contributes to this problem in a significant way by feeding off the disinformation campaign unleashed by the Dalai Lama’s headquarters and the votaries of Tibetan ‘independence,’ with only a pretence at independent reporting.

　　The Chinese government regards sabotage, including some major acts of violence, by the Dalai Lama-led separatist elements as a major factor hampering Tibet’s development. Taking this assessment as a starting point, the paper analyzes in detail, and draws conclusions from, the diametrically opposed positions of the Chinese government and the 14th Dalai Lama on the major political questions relating to Tibet’s status, development, and future – the questions of sovereignty, territoriality, autonomy, and socio-economic and political systems. Foremost among them is the issue of sovereignty, as was made clear by Deng Xiaoping in 1979; everything else is subordinate to this question. It is important to recognize that the sovereignty question sets the terms for, and closely interacts with, the other key political questions – territoriality, autonomy, and socio-economic and political systems – relevant to the sustainable development and future of Tibet.

　　The long-term assessment of China’s political leadership is that the 14th Dalai Lama cannot be treated merely, or even primarily, as a religious leader. In fact, he is a consummate politician leading a movement that seeks to take ‘Greater Tibet’ away from the motherland – an anti-communist and separatist political figure, with external links, complicit in a number of acts of violence and sabotage and responsible for serious and long-lasting damage to the sustainable development of Tibet and the well-being of Tibetans. The Dalai Lama’s track record over the past six decades bears out this assessment.

　　Nevertheless, finding a permanent solution in Tibet through a negotiated end to the Dalai Lama-led ‘independence for Tibet’ campaign and activities is clearly in China’s national interest and therefore an important political objective. Deng Xiaping’s long-sighted and strategically wise formulation of March 1979, which was elaborated on subsequently, on many occasions, by top Chinese leaders, is key to the Communist Party of China’s, and the Chinese central government’s, playbook on Tibet. It also opened the door to contacts and talks, structured and informal, with more than 20 groups of Tibetans from abroad who have been close to the Dalai Lama, including his elder brother and other personal representatives.

　　The condition laid down by the Chinese central government for contacts with the Dalai Lama is that “he gives up his demand for ‘Tibet independence,’ stops separatist activities, and acknowledges publicly that Tibet and Taiwan are both inalienable parts of Chinese territory.” In response, the Dalai Lama, while saying different things in different places to suit his audience and continuing his support for the ‘independence for Tibet’ campaign and the disruptive activities of the militant separatist elements, has declared that he is willing to explore and accept a comprehensive political settlement within the sovereignty, Constitution, and laws of the People’s Republic of China.